Brigham Young University

BYU ScholarsArchive
Faculty Publications
2010-06-04

Why We Don’t Understand the Rule of Law or Explaining the Rule
of Law: A Practice in Search of a Theory
Noel B. Reynolds
Brigham Young University - Provo, nbr@byu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Reynolds, Noel B., "Why We Don’t Understand the Rule of Law or Explaining the Rule of Law: A Practice in
Search of a Theory" (2010). Faculty Publications. 1464.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/1464

This Presentation is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information,
please contact ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Why We Don’t Understand the Rule of Law
or

Explaining the Rule of Law: A Practice in Search of a Theory
J. Reuben Clark Society
Las Vegas Chapter
June 4, 2010
ABSTRACT:
This lecture summarizes the main attempts to formulate an understanding of
rule of law among legal theorists and explains why they fail to account for the real
experience of law. It also explains key characteristics of law that need to be
recognized in an adequate account of the rule of law.
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I.

Introduction: In spite of the growing world-wide appreciation for the rule of
law as a crucial foundation for modern civilization, we still limp along with
theories of law that do not provide a central role for or adequately explain
the rule of law.
A.

The “rule of law” is most simply defined as the government of laws
and not men. It is understood to be the opposite of tyranny in which
some strong man or faction rules all others for their own interests.

B.

The idea of rule of law arose anciently, has arisen repeatedly in
different times and places, and even exists in some form in most
primitive societies. The American founding is famous for producing
the most advanced theoretical understanding of the rule of law and
the most substantial support for the rule of law in a general
population.
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II.

C.

While the advantages of more complex and expansive political and
economic organization for the enhancement of quality of life and
expansion of individual opportunity, are historically obvious, all
institutions of authority invite corruption as humans see opportunities
to convert authority into private power.

D.

While a variety of practical institutional devices and political
doctrines have emerged over the centuries to curb subversions of
public authority to private advantage, none work perfectly or
consistently, and in some countries cynicism regarding the rule of law
is overwhelming.

In the course of the normal human quest for explanations, three principal
strategies for explaining the recurring phenomenon of law have persisted.
A.

The common sense view of law from ancient times to the present has
been conventionalist in the sense that law is assumed to derive its
authority from some kind of agreement between the citizens of the
polity, an agreement based on an assumption that their interests are
better served by yielding some of their natural liberty for improved
protections, etc.
1.

This view has distinguished ancient and modern defenders.
a.

Plato’s Republic assumes a social contract as the obvious
origin of the state, and in his Crito, Socrates chooses to
die, rather than give anyone an excuse to believe that he
would violate that promise and obligation to the city.

b.

Most recently, England’s most prestigious judge, Tom
Bingham, concluded his famous lecture on the rule of
law with this observation:
But it seems to me that the rule of law does depend on an
unspoken but fundamental bargain between the
individual and the state, the governed and the governor,
by which both sacrifice a measure of the freedom and
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power which they would otherwise enjoy. The individual
living in society implicitly accepts that he or she cannot
exercise the unbridled freedom enjoyed by Adam in the
Garden of Eden, before the creation of Eve, and accepts
the constraints imposed by laws properly made because
of the benefits which, on balance, they confer. The state
for its part accepts that it may not do, at home or abroad,
all that it has the power to do but only that which laws
binding upon it authorise it to do. If correct, this
conclusion is reassuring to all of us who, in any capacity,
devote our professional lives to the service of the law.
For it means that we are not, as we are sometimes seen,
mere custodians of a body of arid prescriptive rules but
are, with others, the guardians of an all but sacred flame
which animates and enlightens the society in which we
live.1
2.

B.

1

But this explanation appears to fail when we note that it is
difficult or impossible to demonstrate the existence of any such
agreement for most legal societies.
a.

This happens explicitly when new citizens gain their
citizenship.

b.

But when did you agree to all this?

c.

I will argue that there are good answers to these
objections, and that this “conventionalist” theoretical
approach is the only one that can explain law adequately
with the idea of the rule of law at the center.

Realists from ancient times to the present point to the fact that public

Tom Bingham, “The Rule of Law,” The Sixth Sir David Williams Lecture, delivered 16
November 2006 to the Centre for Public Law at University of Cambridge, p. 35. This text was
accessed June 1, 2010. at
http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/past_activities/the_rt_hon_lord_bingham_the_rule_of_law.php.
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authority is really based on power, and conclude that law is an
instrument by which the powerful govern the weak, who in turn obey
out of fear or habit. Law is just a social fact.

C.

1.

Inspired by the genius of Jeremy Bentham, John Austin
founded British legal positivism on the claim that when a
gunman points his gun at your head, you are “obliged” by your
interest in self-preservation to do what he requires. But this
seems like a verbal trick. Legal obligation seems more
complicated than that.

2.

H. L. A. Hart’s seminal book, The Concept of Law was
published in 1961 as a fundamental critique and correction of
the Austinian tradition, putting legal positivism on new and
firmer ground and proved to be the focal point for almost all
legal philosophy over the following half century.

3.

But this positivistic approach can make little sense of the moral
force of legal obligation.
a.

Why are citizens obligated to obey the law when it hurts
more than it helps?

b.

And why are judges obligated to enforce the law rather
than their own self-interested advantages?

Religious peoples have frequently made the simplistic link between
divine and civil authority, and have claimed the authority of the gods
as grounding for legal obligation.
1.

In the attempt to maintain this logic for religiously diverse
polities, the notion of natural law developed to claim a link
between universal moral truth or “the good” and the authority
of the laws.

2.

But this does not seem to help much in the courtroom where
judge, counsel, and jury treat law as a social fact, created in a
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procedurally correct way by human authorities for whatever
political or moral reasons they might have had at the time.
3.

The natural law approach actually works against pluralism of
religions and cultures in any legal society by nationalizing the
“true” or “politically correct” view, however that might be seen
by a particular theorist.
a.

Sharia (Islamic law) provides a good example of this
today in Middle Eastern countries where it rules
supreme.

b.

Catholic law held similar sway in the middle ages in
Europe.

c.

Catholic thinkers today have been the principal
promoters of the revival of natural law thinking.

d.

John Finnis, a student of H. L. A. Hart at Oxford, led a
resurgence of natural law theorizing, and attempted a
rapprochement with Hart’s positivism. While he is
respected by most legal philosophers, he is also widely
ignored.

4.

It denies authority to the legislature that makes laws and the
judiciary that must interpret and apply them, reserving that
authority for moral or religious truth.

5.

Finally, natural law has never solved the epistemological
problem—how can we know the truth? It fails to recognize
that law is a general standard by stipulation, and not a
discovered universal truth. Such discoveries have eluded all
human societies.

6.

Where religious law rules, it is based on the agreement of a
homogeneous population or the power of a dominant majority.
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III.

D.

Over the last century, legal theorists have focused principally on the
latter two of these three approaches—natural law and legal
positivism.

E.

But neither approach has provided much traction for understanding
the rule of law as the central goal and product of law.
1.

The practice of rule of law has developed rapidly in modern
societies, with lots of new techniques for controlling corruption
and government power coming into play year by year.

2.

But the legal theory that can explain rule of law in a way that
recognizes its centrality for societies of law has made no
progress.
a.

Rather, both positivist and natural law thinkers continue
to treat the rule of law as a nice ideal which can be
invoked along with other values when describing
particular legal systems.

b.

But neither sees it as the core construct of legal systems.

Human nature presents both the opportunity and the problem.
A.

The opportunity: Humans are naturally inventive and collaborative,
discovering new ways of working together to improve the quality of
their lives and their world.

B.

The problem: But humans are also naturally self-indulgent, justifying
their own shortcomings when they would not accept the same
behavior in others.
1.

Philosophers from Plato to David Hume and the Founding
Fathers have recognized the corruptibility of human nature.

2.

Neurobiologists now conclude that the human brain is just
designed that way, and that we can develop compensatory
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practices, but not remedial ones.
IV.

Legal society is one of the most powerful human inventions ever, and has
given rise to modern civilization. Modern society would be impossilbe
without law.
A.

V.

It provides individual freedom of action, harnessing the creative
power and initiative of the entire population.
1.

This is accomplished principally by the shift from commands to
rules. When citizens know the rules by which their conduct
will be judged, they can pursue their own objectives within the
constraints posed by the rules.

2.

Further, by holding authoritative persons to the same rules, the
citizenry is protected from exploitative behavior from
government.

B.

It protects markets and private business initiatives. (E.g., market law
in the late middle ages.)

C.

It expands both consumer and production markets by making
contracts between strangers enforceable.

D.

It protects a variety of religious and cultural perspectives and makes
pluralist society possible. We can live together peacefully and
productively without having first to agree on the ultimate questions.

Contemporary efforts to establish the rule of law in post-soviet and postcolonial countries over the last four decades appear to be losing the battle,
and rule-of-law practitioners have now publicly confessed that there is no
adequate theoretical account of law and the rule of law to provide guidance
for their efforts.
A.

Rule of law practices are highly developed and widely known.
American style constitutional democracy has returned to preeminence as a world-wide political ideal after a century interlude
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when many developing nations were captured by the Marxist vision.
1.

Legal procedures ensure neutral treatment in cases of legal
conflict.

2.

Constitutionalism is the science of so constructing the
functions and procedures of government as to preserve the rule
of law and to minimize the likelihood of tyranny—of the
concentration of power in a few persons.
a.

Principles of constitutionalism reached their highest
development in the American constitution, but
constitutional thinking continues to develop.

b.

Examples of constitutional principles that are sometimes
confused with principles of the rule of law, but which
function to protect those principles from constant and
undue pressure would include:
(1)

Separation of powers was so important in the eyes
of Montesquieu, the French admirer of the British
constitution, that he simply equated it with the rule
of law.

(2)

Checks and balances existed in English practice,
but were raised to new practical and theoretical
heights by Madison and other American founders,
who were inspired by David Hume’s philosophical
writing on political factions and how to control
them in government.

(3)

Independent judiciary

(4)

Election of public officers by secret ballot for
limited terms

(5)

Bicameralism—requiring the majority vote of two
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separate legislatures elected on different principles
drastically reduces the range of politically feasible
initiatives and the opportunity for exploitative
legislation from temporary legislative majorities.
B.

But rule of law theory is partial and inconsistent.
1.

Rule of law is widely understood as a political or legal ideal
that is independent of any particular theory of law.

2.

It is most effectively identified as a set of principles which
implicitly limit the kinds of rules that can be laws, including:

3.

VI.

a.

Normativity: laws must be stated as rules, not
commands.

b.

Generality: the rules must apply to all citizens all the
time—including those in positions of public authority.

c.

Equality: the laws cannot be different for different social
groups or classes.

d.

Prospectivity: laws can only be enforced when they have
been enacted and published in advance.

e.

Possibility: Laws cannot require citizen conduct which is
impossible or impracticable.

It is often confused with constitutionalism itself or with human
rights theories.

Legal positivism and natural law theory may have run their course as is
evident from their failure to explain this core legal concept—the rule of law.
If conventionalism is to be developed as a theory of law that can make sense
of the rule of law, it will have to establish the following:
A.

Humans naturally think in terms of imagined realities—“as if” the
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world were constructed this way or that. This is now clearly
established by studies of how the human brain works.
B.

C.

Rule-making is the normal way for humans to solve their problems
with each other.
1.

Infants can learn the rules of language and of the home.

2.

We all learn to make our own rules in the home and in games
we play. Legislation (stipulating rules or normative
expectations) is natural to humans.

Human beings can create moral obligation by submitting to the
expectations of others—making those expectations legitimate or
authoritative. (Michael Oakeshott)
1.

D.

E.

Thomas Hobbes, in his much misunderstood 1651 book
Leviathan, advanced the theoretical basis of the conventionalist
approach and stated that “no man can be obligated save by an
act of his own.”

The public authority to make and enforce laws derives from an
implicit and universal agreement of the citizens.
1.

Agreement can be assumed by participation when free exit is
allowed, and

2.

When all participants have appropriate opportunity to influence
the formation of the rules.

The principles of the rule of law are the implicit and sometimes
explicit reservations that we have placed on public officials in the
exercise of their powers.
1.

Adherence to these restrictions is what makes sense of
universal agreement–unanimity underlying authority.
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2.

2

a.

The Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 in Britain
stipulates that the Act does not adversely affect “the
existing constitutional principle of the rule of law.”2

b.

But neither this act, nor any previous legislation defines
that principle.

We can think of them most generally as restrictions we would
insist on imposing on government action where we have given
the government authority to make and enforce rules affecting
all aspects of our lives—where we have given up our veto
rights by entering into civil society. Examples of such
restrictions might include:
a.

Rules cannot violate the deeply held moral and religious
beliefs of citizens. To the extent that these are matters
many people hold to be more important than anything
else, including life itself, it is not reasonable to expect
them to put these at risk in agreements made with others
to improve their situations in other respects. This may
limit the range of moral and religious views that can
share a single legal system. But note that it is a negative
restraint only and does not require complete moral and
religious agreement. It does require religious liberty.

b.

Authoritative decisions cannot arbitrarily single out
individuals or groups for particular penalties or benefits.

c.

The public officials themselves, in their private roles as
citizens and in their public roles as magistrates, are
subject to all the rules they create.

d.

There can only be one set of rules for everyone. There
can be no special (privileged or repressed) categories of
citizens.

Quoted by Bingham, p. 1.
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e.

Rules cannot be changed after the fact or made
retroactive in their application without the actual consent
of all concerned or compensation to those negatively
affected.

f.

All making and enforcement of rules must be knowable.
and observable by all citizens.

g.

Every citizen must have reasonable access to the process
by which the rules are formulated and administered.

h.

Every citizen, when accused of rule violations, must
have full opportunity to defend his or her case before
disinterested judges.

VII. Conclusions and further observations:
A.

Recent work in neurobiology surprisingly opens the way to overcome
long-standing objections to the conventionalist approach to
explaining law and the rule of law.

B.

The conventionalist approach makes clear that the rule of law exists
first in the minds of the citizens.
1.

Unless they understand it and support it vigorously, it cannot
survive the determined efforts of would-be tyrants.

2.

Public virtue is essential for the successful regime of law.

C.

The world-wide pursuit of rule of law will not succeed unless it can
find a way to instill this understanding and commitment at the grass
roots level in nations that have no tradition of individual liberty.

D.

If the desire for liberty is universal, there can always be hope that
people will choose to sacrifice to achieve it.
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E.

The Americans were inspired by their own inflated notions of liberty
under English law.

F.

The American example now projects an example of liberty under law
to all people through global media and communications.

